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Postwar Stability: Fact or Fiction?
All conventional measures indicate that U.S.
business cycles in the post-World War II period
have been much less severe than were earlier
cycles. For example, the peak-to-trough decline
in detrended real GNP (that is, GNP that has
been adjusted to remove secular growth trends)
averaged eight percent from 1893 to 1927, but
only 4.4 percent since 1951. This disparity would
be even greater if the Great Depression of the
1930s were included in the prewar measure.
Likewise, the peak-to-trough rise in the unem-
ployment rate for the pre-Depression period was
five percentage points, compared to only 1.9
percentage points in the postwar period.
Detrended Real GNP
Pre·Depression Era













Many have attributed the increased stability of
the postwar economy to the success of Keynesian
macroeconomic policies aimed at fine-tuning the
economy. Actively managed monetary and fiscal
policies, it is argued, partially have offset output
declines during recessions by supporting aggre-
gate demand and reined in excess output growth
during booms by slowing aggregate demand
growth.
This traditional interpretation has been called
into question in recent years on several fronts.
For example, real-business-cycle theorists have
questioned this interpretation on theoretical
grounds. Another, and altogether different, line
of attack has come from reinterpretations of the
economic data. This Letter discusses the argu-
ment advanced by University ofCalifornia econ-
omist Christina Romer that the postwar stability
of GNP is a "figment of the data:' According to
Romer, the apparent stability ofthe postwar
economy relative to earlier periods largely
reflects improvements that have been made in
measuring economic activity. If this view is cor-
rect, it suggests that statisticians, not economists,
are responsible for the decline in business cycle
fluctuations.
Measuring GNP
The fluctuations in detrended real GNP shown in
the Chart are based on the standard government
series on the level of the economy's output. How-
ever, these data do not represent a consistent
series, in that the methods used to estimate GNP
have changed over time. These changes reflect
improvements in the quality and quantity of sta-
tistics that are available to the national income
accountants who construct GNP.
The data on prewar GNP largely are based on
work done by Simon Kuznets, whowas awarded
the Nobel Prize in economics in 1971 in recogni-
tion of his important work on economic measure-
ment. To obtain a measure of GNP for the period
from 1869 to 1919, Kuznets constructed data on
value-added for each sector of the economy from
the available data on commodity output (specifi-
cally, output in agriculture, mining, and manu-
facturing), valued at producer prices: He then
assumed that percentage deviations from trend
in GNP were equal to the percentage deviation
from trend in commodity output.
However, this assumption is open to challenge.
In the postwar era, value-added in distribution
and transportation, which is incorporated in
GNP, but not in commodity output, is not as
cyclically sensitive as commodity output is. If
this was also true of the prewar period, Kuznets's
method has overstated the cyclical fluctuations
in sectoral output and GNP.
Since postwar experience calls into question
Kuznets's assumption of a one-for-one corres-
pondence between fluctuations in commodity
output and GNP, Romer suggests an alternativeFR8SF
approach. She estimates the relationship
between GNP and commodity output in the
postwar period and then constructs a measure
of prewar GNP based on the assumption that the
estimated postwar relationship between GNP
and commodity output applies to the prewar
data. Although it uses the same series on com-
modity output that Kuznets used, Romer's new
GNP series for the period from 1893 to 1927 pro-
duces an average peak-to-trough decline in GNP
of 4.8 percent, close to the 4.4 percent figure for
GNP from 1951 to 1980. This one change in the
assumptions used to estimate GNP seems to
eliminate almost completely the greater stability
of the postwar period.
Industrial production
Although GNP provides the most comprehensive
measure of economic activity, the index of in-
dustrial production also is commonly used to
measure business cycle fluctuations. A series on
industrial production for the u.s. is available
beginning in 1860. This series also indicates a
marked decline in the amplitude ofthe business
cycle when the postwar era is compared to
earlier experience. For example, the average
amplitude of cyclical fluctuations in detrended
industrial production was almost 30 percent
higher in the period from 1866 to 1914 than it
was from 1947 to 1982.
Here again, Romer has questioned whether this
comparison simply reflects changes in the qual-
ity of the underlying series on industrial pro-
duction. The Federal Reserve has constructed a
consistent series on industrial production that
begins in 1919. Prior to 1914, the series is based
on work by Edwin Frickey, published in 1947. A
major difference between the two series is in the
range of manufactured commodities included in
each; the Federal Reserve index incorporates
over 200, Frickey's includes only 40.
This difference in coverage does not, by itself,
necessarily imply any bias. However, bias would
arise if the 40 commodities included in the
pre-1914 index exhibited cyclical behavior that
differed systematically from that of the manu-
facturing commodities included in the Federal
Reserve index. For example, to the extent the 40
commodities are especially sensitive to cyclical
movements, Frickey's index will over-estimate
cyclical fluctuations relative to the more com-
plete Federal Reserve index. This, Romer argues,
is exactly what has happened.
Data are not available that would allow the
Federal Reserve index of industrial production to
be consistently constructed for the period prior to
1919. However, it is possible to construct a con-
sistent, but poor, index of industrial production
by applying Frickey's exact methods to the post-
war data. By effectively holding constant the
measurement method, such a series might shed
lighton how much of the difference between the
Frickey and Federal Reserve indices are due to
their construction and how much really reflect
differences in the economy's cyclical behavior.
The results Romer obtains by exactly replicating
Frickey's methods over the postwar period are
quite dramatic. Romer's index shows no differ-
ence in the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations
between the 1866-1914 and the 1947-1982
periods. Taken at face value, this would seem to
indicate that postwar stability simply reflects
postwar methods of measuring fluctuations rather
than any fundamental change in the economy.
The unemployment rate
The increased stability of the unemployment
rate in the postwar era, perhaps more than the
evidence from either the GNP or industrial pro-
duction series, might be taken to indicate the
success of macrostabilization policy in the post-
war period. After all, recession-induced increases
in unemployment are rightly viewed as costly
both to society and to the individuals who be-
come unemployed. Thus, if the seemingly greater
stability of the unemployment rate in the postwar
period can withstand reevaluation, one still
might be able to conclude that the economy's
ability to minimize cyclical fluctuations had
improved since World War II.
Once again, however, Romer argues that our
standard series on unemployment provides a
misleading comparison of the pre- and postwar
periods. Unemployment rate estimates prior to
1930 are based on the work of Stanley Lebergott,
who calculated unemployment as the differenc~
between the estimated size of the labor force and
estimated employment. Romer argues that Leber-
gott's measure of the labor force fails to movewith the business cycle in the prewar period. Yet
in the postwar period, we know that the labor
force has moved procyclically. During recessions,
workers have tended to drop out ofthe labor
force, perhaps because they become discouraged
by their inability to find employment. As a result,
the measured labor force has shrunk during re-
cessions. During economic booms, the opposite
has occurred and the labor force has expanded.
If similar behavior characterized the prewar era,
Lebergott's labor force measure underestimates
the labor force (and therefore unemployment)
during booms and overestimates the labor force
(a.nd onemployment) duringrecessions. More-
over, Romer argues that the methods used to
measure employment in the prewar period rein-
force this tendency to overstate fluctuations in
unemployment.
After attempting to adjust for these measurement
problems, Romer concludes that the greater sta-
bility in theunemployment rate in the postwar
period is much less evident. In fact, Romer's
corrections eliminate almost 75% of the postwar
reduction in the average cyclical fluctuation in
the unemployment rate. Thus, reevaluation of the
usual measure of the unemployment rate appears
to lead to the same conclusion as reevaluation of
the GNP and industrial production data: seem-
ingly greater postwar economic stability may
simply reflect improvements in economic
measurement.
New measures of prewar GNP
Romer's arguments have sparked an important
debate in macroeconomics. One positive out-
come of that debate has been new efforts to
construct consistent measures of u.s. GNP that
would allow pre- and postwar periods to be
compared. Previous comparisons too often com-
pared "poor" prewar data with "good" postwar
data. Some of the comparisons discussed in this
Letter have involved comparing "poor" prewar
data with "poor;' but at least consistent, postwar
data. For example, the pre-World War I series on
industrial production was compared to a postwar
series constructed using the same methods and
limited coverage as had been used to obtain the
earlier series. The conclusions drawn from such
a comparison would carry more weight if a
"good" prewar series could be compared with
a "good" postwar series.
Recent attempts to estimate GNP in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries rely on
the data series that are available and on what
economists have learned about the relationships
between such series and total GNP in the post-
war period. Economists Nathan Balke and Robert
Gordon, for example, have supplemented the
basic series on commodity output used by Romer
with direct measures of noncommodity output for
the period before 1909. They employ a more dis-
aggregated approach than Romer in order to take
advantage of consistent data that do exist for
some components of GNP.
Balke and Gordon also argue that price series
used by previous researchers to convert nominal
GNP into real GNP were too volatile since these
series were based on wholesale materials prices
and not on the more stable consumer prices. By
using a more stable price series, Balke and Gor-
don attribute less of the volatility in nominal
GNP to prices and more to real GNP. They con-
clude that the conventional wisdom was right;
the postwar period has exhibited much greater
stability. In fact, their estimates suggest the
standard series may even have understated the
decline in volatility in comparing the post-1947
period to the pre-1928 period.
Is the apparent reduction in economic instability
during the postwar period in the u.s. fact or fic-
tion? Although more research is needed before a
definitive answer will be available, it appears that
the old view of greater postwar stability may be
weakened but not overturned. In any event, the
debate serves to remind us that the way we see
the economy depends importantly on the quality
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